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Report on the Latin American economy. First half of 2010
The Latin American economies are facing the fi rst half of 2010 in a climate of fi rming eco-
nomic recovery, after the region witnessed the biggest decline in activity of the past 30 years 
(–2.1%) in 2009. Despite this fall, there is a generalised view that the impact of the global fi nan-
cial crisis on Latin America has been comparatively limited, especially bearing in mind the 
propensity of the area to crises and the depth of such crises in the past. Further, the decline is 
largely due to the intensity of the recession in Mexico (–6.5%) and, to a lesser extent, in Ven-
ezuela (–3.3%), which biases the region’s aggregate fi gure downwards. The fall in activity in 
Brazil and Chile was relatively slight, and in the remaining economies (Argentina, Colombia, 
Peru and Uruguay) GDP did not actually decline (see Table 1).
During 2009, Latin America underwent a progressive recovery, resuming a positive year-on-
year growth rate of 1.3% in Q4, more than 5 pp up on the low recorded in Q2, although in 
quarter-on-quarter terms, positive growth could be seen from this quarter onwards. Underpin-
ning this pick-up were two pillars. First, external demand-pull, stemming from the Asian econo-
mies, which has essentially benefi ted the commodities-exporting countries of South America 
and which has been added to in recent months by something of a recovery in other markets 
(such as the United States). And further, the progressive recovery in internal demand. This was 
based on the expansionary effect of the policies applied during the crisis, which continued 
operating throughout 2009, but also on the sound behaviour of labour markets, the inventory 
cycle and improved confi dence. In line with this support, the latest data confi rm a relatively swift 
recovery in a large number of countries (Brazil, Chile, Peru and also Mexico), while only Vene-
zuela is expected to remain in recession. Undoubtedly, the fact that the global fi nancial crisis 
has not translated into a fi nancial crisis in the region is a key factor behind this recovery.
In step with these developments, the outlook for 2010 has been revised upwards in almost all 
the countries. Indeed, economic performance is expected to be more favourable than in the 
developed countries, though not as positive as in the Asian economies. However, it should be 
said that the crisis has entailed a signifi cant loss in output in some countries (see Chart 1). The 
sound economic outlook, along with the continuing positive interest rate spreads vis-à-vis the 
developed economies, have allowed for the return of capital fl ows and a generalised improve-
ment in fi nancing conditions, accompanied by the reactivation of reserves-building (reserves 
are already above previous levels) and, in some cases, the restoring of capital controls. In 
contrast to this general picture, some factors of vulnerability remain. Cases in point are the 
substantial devaluation of the Venezuelan bolivar in January, against a persistent recessionary 
background, and the circumstances surrounding the use of international currency reserves for 
the payment of external debt in Argentina.
Infl ation in the region has tended to rise moderately since the start of 2010, posting a year-on-
year rate of 6.5% in March, following a year of continuous declines towards a rate close to 5%. 
The increase was due in part to base effects, to the pick-up in energy and food prices (af-
fected in some countries by specifi c weather-related factors), and to the one-off effect of rises 
in indirect taxes and administered prices. Upside risks are also discernible in some countries, 
in a setting of more dynamic growth.
In the short run, the recovery phase poses two types of challenges for the region’s economic 
authorities. The fi rst concerns the design of an appropriate exit from the measures applied 
during the crisis and the re-adaptation of economic policy frameworks to a more normal envi-
Introduction
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2010
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 March
GDP (year-on-year rate)
Latin America (a) 5.8 4.2 -2.1 5.3 5.6 5.0 0.8 -2.8 -4.0 -2.6 1.3
Argentina 8.7 6.8 0.9 8.5 7.8 6.9 4.1 2.0 -0.8 -0.3 2.6
Brazil 6.1 5.1 -0.2 6.3 6.5 7.1 0.8 -2.1 -1.6 -1.2 4.3
Mexico 3.3 1.5 -6.5 2.6 3.0 1.6 -1.1 -7.9 -10.0 -6.1 -2.3
Chile 4.6 3.7 -1.5 3.7 5.1 5.2 0.7 -2.1 -4.5 -1.4 2.1
Colombia 7.5 2.4 0.4 4.2 3.7 2.9 -1.0 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 2.5
Venezuela 8.1 4.8 -3.3 4.9 7.2 3.8 3.5 0.5 -2.6 -4.6 -5.8
Peru 8.9 9.8 0.9 10.3 11.8 10.9 6.5 1.9 -1.2 -0.6 3.4
Uruguay 7.2 8.7 2.7 7.6 10.2 9.4 7.6 2.8 0.9 2.6 4.3
CPI (year-on-year rate)
Latin America (a) 5.4 7.8 6.4 6.6 7.7 8.5 8.5 7.6 6.7 5.9 5.4 6.5
Argentina 8.8 8.6 6.3 8.5 9.1 8.9 7.8 6.6 5.5 5.9 7.1 9.7
Brazil 3.6 5.7 4.9 4.6 5.6 6.3 6.2 5.8 5.2 4.4 4.2 5.2
Mexico 4.0 5.1 5.3 3.9 4.9 5.5 6.2 6.2 6.0 5.1 4.0 5.0
Chile 4.4 8.7 0.4 8.0 8.9 9.3 8.6 4.8 1.8 -1.9 -3.0 0.3
Colombia 5.5 7.0 4.2 6.1 6.4 7.7 7.8 6.6 4.8 3.2 2.4 1.8
Venezuela 18.8 31.4 28.6 26.3 31.0 34.6 33.4 29.5 28.2 28.7 28.1 28.2
Peru 1.8 5.8 2.9 4.8 5.5 6.1 6.6 5.6 4.0 1.9 0.4 0.8
Uruguay 8.1 7.9 7.1 7.7 7.6 7.6 8.6 8.2 6.7 7.1 6.3 7.1
BUDGET BALANCE (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) (c) -0.3 -0.5 -2.7 0.0 -0.3 -0.2 -0.5 -1.5 -2.1 -3.0 -2.7
Argentina 1.1 1.4 -0.6 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.4 1.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.6
Brazil -2.6 -2.0 -3.2 -1.6 -2.2 -1.8 -2.0 -2.8 -3.1 -4.1 -3.2
Mexico 0.0 -0.1 -2.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.1 -1.4 -1.7 -2.4 -2.3
Chile 8.6 5.0 -4.6 9.2 7.2 6.1 5.0 1.3 -1.5 -3.9 -4.6
Colombia -2.8 -1.8 -4.0 -2.1 -2.5 -2.3 -1.8 -2.8 -3.0 -3.3 -4.0
Venezuela 3.0 -1.2 — 3.4 1.7 0.9 -1.2 -2.2 — — —
Peru 1.8 2.2 -2.0 2.3 3.1 2.1 2.2 1.3 -0.1 -0.8 -2.0
Uruguay 0.0 -1.5 -1.7 1.0 -0.3 -1.0 -1.5 -2.1 -2.2 -2.2 -1.7
PUBLIC DEBT (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) 33.8 30.8 35.8 31.7 31.6 30.4 30.8 31.2 32.8 35.5 35.8
Argentina 52.6 44.7 47.9 52.4 50.4 45.8 44.7 41.9 44.2 46.1 48.0
Brazil 45.1 38.4 42.9 40.8 41.8 40.0 38.4 39.1 41.2 43.2 42.9
Mexico 21.0 24.5 28.2 21.0 20.7 20.8 24.5 25.4 26.7 28.4 28.2
Chile 4.1 5.2 6.1 3.6 3.9 4.5 5.2 5.0 4.9 5.8 6.1
Colombia 32.9 33.4 35.5 32.6 32.6 32.8 33.4 36.8 35.2 34.0 35.5
Venezuela 22.7 13.2 — 20.9 13.6 12.6 13.2 11.5 15.4 17.4 —
Peru 29.8 24.1 26.7 27.6 25.3 23.9 24.1 24.8 26.1 26.9 26.7
Uruguay 68.1 52.6 68.9 65.4 63.7 57.8 52.6 56.7 60.4 66.7 68.7
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) (b) 0.7 -0.5 -0.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.7 -0.1
Argentina 2.8 2.2 3.7 2.8 2.2 2.8 2.2 2.1 3.3 3.6 3.7
Brazil 0.1 -1.7 -1.5 -0.6 -1.1 -1.5 -1.7 -1.5 -1.2 -1.2 -1.5
Mexico -0.8 -1.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -0.9 -1.4 -1.4 -1.3 -1.3 -0.6
Chile 4.5 -1.5 2.6 3.3 2.4 0.6 -1.4 -2.0 -1.4 0.7 2.6
Colombia -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.2 -2.0 -2.1 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8
Venezuela 7.9 11.7 2.2 9.7 12.8 15.9 11.7 7.4 2.8 -0.5 2.2
Peru 1.3 -3.7 0.2 0.3 -1.3 -2.4 -3.7 -3.3 -1.9 -0.8 0.2
Uruguay -0.9 -4.8 0.8 -1.5 -4.2 -4.3 -4.8 -3.6 -1.0 -0.1 0.8
EXTERNAL DEBT (% of GDP)
Latin America (a) (b) 19.9 17.6 20.5 19.9 19.0 18.2 17.4 18.7 19.6 20.9 20.5
Argentina 47.8 38.3 38.4 46.6 44.6 40.6 39.2 37.4 38.2 39.3 38.4
Brazil 14.1 12.1 12.6 14.1 13.3 12.3 11.8 12.2 13.3 14.1 12.4
Mexico 12.1 11.5 18.6 12.1 11.6 11.3 11.4 14.8 15.9 17.8 18.5
Chile 34.0 38.0 44.7 33.4 35.1 37.5 37.6 40.0 42.1 45.3 45.0
Colombia 21.4 19.1 23.2 18.6 18.7 18.7 19.1 20.2 20.0 22.1 23.2
Venezuela 24.4 18.9 19.2 24.0 22.6 20.1 18.9 18.3 18.1 18.7 19.2
Peru 30.6 27.3 28.0 31.6 30.0 28.2 27.3 27.5 28.0 28.4 28.0
Uruguay 51.0 38.5 44.2 48.5 44.6 40.5 38.2 39.2 40.9 45.4 44.0
20092008
2007 2008 2009
SOURCE: National statistics. 
a. Aggregate of the eight represented countries, except Uruguay. 
b. Four-quarter moving average. 
c. Excluding Venezuela. 
LATIN AMERICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS TABLE 1
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ronment. Generally, the stimuli applied in Latin America have not been of the exceptional na-
ture of those applied in the industrialised economies. Accordingly, exit strategy discussions 
have focused on the stance to be adopted by conventional policies, i.e. monetary policy and, 
to a lesser extent, fi scal policy, and on the advisability or not of maintaining external fi nancial 
support. The limited impact of the crisis in Latin America has seen plaudits for the economic 
policy framework applied in many countries and, in particular, for the infl ation-targeting re-
gimes, the build-up of reserves and the controlled fl exibility of exchange rates, which during 
the crisis allowed interest rates to be reduced and exchange-rate volatility to be mitigated 
through interventions (see Box 1). A second challenge for economic policy concerns the man-
agement of capital infl ows, with the dual aim of preventing the overvaluation of assets (and of 
the exchange rate) and the adverse effects of the volatility of these fl ows.
In the wake of the crisis, the region also faces other, longer-term challenges. First, the growth 
outlook in many countries will be adversely affected by the expected lower growth in the 
United States (albeit offset in part by trade diversifi cation towards Asia) and by a potential rise 
in the cost of capital, once monetary conditions in the industrialised countries normalise. Fur-
ther, it should not be forgotten that Latin America remains far behind as regards the level and 
growth of productivity, in relation to other emerging areas. That reinforces the need to push 
through the structural reforms which, following the boom years fi rst, and the crisis afterwards, 
were consigned to the background. Turning to multilateral relations, at the forefront of discus-
sions is the role of international fi nancial institutions in crisis-prevention and, in particular, 
whether or not they can effectively provide instruments that can replace, albeit partially, self-
insurance via the build-up of reserves, the attractiveness of which appears to have increased 
in the wake of the crisis.
Since mid-2009, the world economy has grown at a higher-than-expected rate, not far off the 
average growth during the pre-crisis years, of around 4.5% in annualised quarterly terms. 
Underpinning this growth have been the public support measures, the progressive improve-
ment in confi dence and the gradual restoring of trade and fi nancial fl ows. Nonetheless, the 
recovery is not spreading evenly across the different countries and regions, and is very biased 
Economic and fi nancial 
developments: external 
environment
GDP 
Index 
CHART 1 
SOURCES: Oxford Latin American Economic History Database, Consensus Forecasts and 
Datastream. 
 
a. Consensus forecasts for 2010 and 2011. The broken lines represent growth since 2008 if the 
trend of the historic average between 1990 and 2008 had held. 
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BOX ?TÍTULO RECUADRO 1INFLATION TARGETS AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES1
Infl ation targeting (IT) is a monetary policy arrangement adopted by an 
increasing number of countries. The total is 27 at present, 19 of which 
are emerging economies.2 In Latin America the main economies, except 
Argentina and Venezuela, have retained an IT arrangement since 1999.
In these economies the IT regime generally entailed replacing the ex-
ternal anchor provided by the exchange rate with a domestic anchor, 
based on the credibility and independence of monetary policies. 
Conceivably, this credibility would help anchor infl ation expectations 
and reduce them. In principle, the free fl oat of the nominal exchange 
rate is one of the theoretical conditions for the sound functioning of 
this type of regime since, given unfettered capital movements, an 
independent monetary policy cannot be combined with a fi xed ex-
change rate or one pegged to another currency by means of foreign 
exchange interventions (this is habitually known as the “impossible 
trinity”). Accordingly, some argue that one of the costs of adopting IT 
is precisely the increase in exchange rate volatility, which may exert 
adverse effects that are particularly signifi cant for the emerging econ-
omies, given their greater real and fi nancial vulnerabilities.
Hence, in the emerging economies, we can observe what Calvo 
and Reinhardt (2002)3 coined as “fear of fl oating”. Therefore, de-
1. Based on J.C. Berganza and C. Broto (2010): “Infl ation targeting and ex-
change rate volatility in emerging countries: Credibility vs. fl exibility”,  mimeo. 
2. See International Monetary Fund (2005), “Does infl ation targeting work in 
emerging markets?”, in IMF, World Economic Outlook, September, Chap. IV, 
and J.S. Little and T.F. Romano (2009), Infl ation targeting – Central Bank Prac-
tice Overseas, Public Policy Briefs, no. 08-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. 
3. See G. Calvo and C. Reinhart (2002), “Fear of Floating”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 117 (2), pp. 379-408.
SOURCES: Datastream, IMF (2005) and Banco de España. 
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TÍTULO RECUADRO
spite theoretical reservations in this connection, most of the emerg-
ing economies with IT usually pursue an active management of the 
exchange rate, to mitigate its volatility or also its medium-term 
movements, which translates into interventions on foreign ex-
change markets. This eclectic means of applying the monetary 
policy arrangement, which has been called “fl exible IT”, gave rise 
to some debate on the validity and viability of this type of arrange-
ment versus so-called “pure IT”, where the exchange rate is not in 
central banks’ reaction function.
There is division in the literature on this issue as to whether IT (fl exi-
ble or not) has proven key to reducing actual infl ation in the emerg-
ing economies in recent years, although there is a bias towards an 
affi rmative reply [see Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2006)].4 Howev-
er, the relationship between IT and exchange rate volatility in the 
emerging economies and, more particularly, in Latin America has 
hardly been studied in the literature, and not in the past two years of 
crisis. In this context, the economic and fi nancial crisis that began in 
the summer of 2007 is a very interesting natural experiment for ex-
amining this issue which, moreover, may prove useful for drawing 
some economic policy lessons at a time at which the role of mone-
tary policy in promoting fi nancial stability is under debate.
By way of illustration, the accompanying panel depicts the daily 
percentage change (return) in the nominal exchange rate against 
the dollar of the fi ve countries in the region that have IT, along with 
the date the formal target was adopted. The panel also highlights 
the change (return) for Argentina, whose currency was highly infl u-
enced in the opening months of the sample by the effect of the 
2001 crisis. The panel shows that in all the countries of the region 
with IT, the volatility of their exchange rates against the dollar has 
increased during the current crisis, which dates back to 2007 Q3, 
although the rise in exchange rate instability was also recorded in 
countries without IT, such as Argentina. It can also be seen that, 
except in Brazil’s case, the relationship between the adoption of IT 
and exchange rate volatility is not evident and, even in Brazil’s case, 
the result is biased by the prior fi xed exchange rate regime.
To analyse whether exchange rate volatility was signifi cantly different 
in countries with an IT arrangement, a more rigorous analysis using 
an econometric estimation is needed. Here, use has been made of 
a panel data model that analyses the relationship between exchange 
rate volatility, the adoption of IT and foreign exchange market inter-
ventions for a sample of emerging countries with and without IT, with 
a particular focus on the crisis period.5 The role of foreign exchange 
market interventions is also studied to see whether their effect on 
exchange rate volatility is different in countries with IT.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the empirical work for 
Latin America. First, and in line with other emerging economies, pur-
suing an IT arrangement appears to entail signifi cantly greater ex-
change rate volatility than in countries that have not adopted this 
policy mechanism over the period under analysis. The second con-
clusion is that although this greater exchange rate volatility for the 
countries in the region that pursue IT holds after the outbreak of the 
crisis, foreign exchange market interventions have only proven effec-
tive for this group of countries in the region when it comes to mod-
erating exchange rate volatility. In contrast, in those countries with-
out IT, foreign exchange interventions do not appear to have had a 
signifi cant effect on exchange rate volatility.
These fi ndings appear to support the behaviour of fl exible infl ation 
targeting regimes in Latin America. Indeed, they suggest that foreign 
exchange interventions in periods of particular fi nancial stress may 
be more effective in lessening exchange rate volatility than other 
monetary policy arrangements. It remains to be seen whether these 
episodes of strong foreign exchange market interventions have un-
dermined the credibility of central banks although, as analysed in the 
main body of the text, no disanchoring of infl ation expectations has 
been observed in these countries.
1INFLATION TARGETS AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (cont’d)
4. Mishkin and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2006), Does It Make A Difference?, Docu-
mento de Trabajo no. 404, Banco Central de Chile.
5. A sample comprising the 18 emerging countries which, according to the IMF, 
have adopted formal IT and a control group of 15 countries that have not 
adopted this monetary policy mechanism (excluded from this control group are 
formally “dollarised” economies or those with a fi xed exchange rate) is studied. 
The following Latin American countries are in this control group: Argentina, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica and Uruguay. The peri-
od from 1995 to end-2009 is analysed, as are the sub-samples prior and sub-
sequent to the outbreak of the fi nancial crisis which is dated back to 2007 Q3. 
The variable that proxies exchange rate volatility is calculated on the basis of 
the quarterly volatility of the daily returns on the bilateral exchange rate with the 
dollar. Added in the regressions is a series of control variables such as trade 
openness, the current-account balance as a proportion of GDP, GDP per cap-
ita and certain measures of the volatility of fi nancial variables that proxy global 
volatility factors.
towards Asia. This region accounted for more than three-quarters of world growth in the sec-
ond half of 2009, and was the only world region that grew over the course of 2009 (see Chart 2). 
Among the Latin American economies, this Asian bias in growth tended to favour those South 
American countries with tighter trade links with Asia. Conversely, it was relatively detrimental 
to countries such as Mexico, given its closer trade ties with the United States. That said, the 
US recovery from 2009 Q4 (when it posted an annualised quarterly growth rate of 5.6%) also 
provided a signifi cant external boost to the Mexican economy. Growth in Europe and Japan 
was somewhat more moderate than in the United States in late 2009, while Eastern Europe 
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saw a decline in activity greater than that in Latin America, over the year as a whole, weighed 
down by the adjustment of private-sector overindebtedness.
International fi nancial markets have continued to trend favourably over the past six months, 
although their behaviour has not been free from bouts of instability, especially in early 2010 
when uncertainty over the fi scal position of certain European countries heightened. This epi-
sode is indicative of the risks afoot despite the recovery, and highlights the diffi culties that may 
arise in withdrawing the various monetary, fi nancial and fi scal stimuli. Accordingly, regions that 
are relatively integrated into international markets in trade and fi nancial terms, such as the 
Latin American economies, may be affected by the pace at and manner in which these exit 
strategies unfold.
In the second half of 2009 and in early 2010, the main central banks held their offi cial interest 
rates at levels close to zero, although they progressively withdrew their exceptional liquidity-
provision facilities. Long-term interest rates rose to around 3.9% in the United States, a total 
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increase of 40 bp over the past six months. This may be interpreted, fi rst, as a move towards 
normalisation following investors’ heavy fl ight towards safe-haven assets during the crisis; and 
further, as a response to the substantial increase in the volume of sovereign issues taking 
place, in the face of growing levels of public debt. On the foreign exchange markets, the im-
proved US growth outlook and the uncertainty associated with the fi scal position of certain 
European economies led to an appreciation of the dollar against the euro in recent months, by 
around 13%.
The emerging markets largely trended in line with global markets, benefi ting to January from 
the renewed appetite for risk, although they were not immune to the bouts of instability. Sov-
ereign spreads, proxied by the EMBI+, fell by some 85 bp to around 255 bp, marking a low for 
the period since May 2008. Consequently, the rise in US long rates did not entail a direct rise 
in the cost of fi nancing for the emerging economies, where sovereign spreads most fell, offset-
ting this rise in full. Across the different regions, the EMBI indices for Latin America, Eastern 
Europe and Asia fell virtually in parallel, although in Eastern Europe the movement was margin-
ally more favourable (a decline of around 90 bp), following the severe diffi culties the previous 
year. The emerging economies’ stock markets, proxied by the MSCI indices in dollars, also 
posted similar gains to those of the developed economies (around 6% in the last six months). 
Both the Latin American and the Asian indices are close to their pre-crisis 2008 high, while the 
Eastern European index remains down on this level. Despite the strengthening of the dollar 
against the other main currencies (the euro, sterling and the yen), many emerging currencies 
- with the notable exception of the Chinese renminbi - tended in turn to appreciate against the 
US currency.
The incipient signs of recovery in activity observed in Latin America from Q2 onwards were 
confi rmed and spread across the whole region during the second half of 2009, with the excep-
tion of Venezuela. In quarterly rates, activity rose by 1.5% in Q3 and by 1.7% in Q4, which 
suffi ced to allow for a resumption of growth in terms of the year-on-year rate at the end of the 
year (1.3%), following the low of –4% in Q2 (see Chart 3). In 2009 as a whole there was a 
signifi cant decline of 2.1% in activity, with Mexico accounting for almost 90% of this. In terms 
of demand components, the fall in GDP in the region was due principally to a 10.5% decline in 
gross capital formation and, to a lesser extent, to the fall in private consumption (–0.3%). In 
contrast, external demand contributed positively to growth (owing to the collapse of imports 
and, to a lesser extent, of exports), while government consumption (4.6%) was the sole do-
mestic demand component that grew in 2009.
As from Q4 the recovery gathered momentum, proving particularly robust in Brazil (4.3% year-
on-year) and Peru (2.4%), followed by Chile, Colombia and Argentina (around 2%). Converse-
ly, Mexico and Venezuela are estimated to have run negative year-on-year growth rates at the 
end of the year, although the quarter-on-quarter rates (shown in Chart 3) show Mexico to be 
growing at a similar rate to Brazil in the fi nal two quarters of 2009. As regards the composition 
of growth, though external demand made the main contribution in Q4, in year-on-year terms 
the negative contribution of domestic demand lessened considerably. This was because both 
private and government consumption contributed positively to growth, whereas there was a 
reduction in the sharp contraction of gross capital formation and stockbuilding observed in the 
previous quarters (see Chart 4). These developments point to a change in the composition of 
growth towards domestic demand, a change more evident in the associated quarter-on-quar-
ter rates, where the sign of the contributions has already altered.
Private consumption resumed a positive growth rate (2% year-on-year in Q4), and the recovery 
in this variable was relatively widespread across the different countries (with the exceptions of 
Activity and demand
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Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela), although the different conditions in terms of fi nancing and 
of labour markets explain some of the divergences. In particular, the relative resilience of the 
labour market in the region as a whole, where the unemployment rate increased relatively little 
during the crisis (by some 2 pp) and stabilised at around 8% of the labour force, and the con-
tribution of public-sector banks to sustaining credit to the private sector in some countries 
(especially in Brazil, where the public sector retains a sizeable market share, but also in Chile 
and Argentina) acted as a prop to private consumption. In this respect, although a clear recov-
ery is not yet discernible in credit, it has tended to stabilise in recent months following the 
strong slowdown in 2008 and 2009 (see Chart 5); were it not for the role played by public-
sector banks, credit to the private sector, measured in real terms, would probably be falling in 
many countries. The growth of private consumption has been particularly signifi cant in Brazil 
(7.7% year-on-year in Q4), boosted by the resilience of employment in the face of the crisis 
(the unemployment rate ended the year at 6.8%, a historical low despite the recession) and by 
the improvement in fi nancing conditions, supported by public-sector banks and the decline in 
borrowing costs on markets. At the other extreme, private consumption declined by 6.8% 
year-on-year in Venezuela. The contributing factors here were companies’ limited access to 
dollar-denominated fi nancing and the depreciation of the parallel exchange rate of the bolivar. 
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In Mexico, private consumption posted a 3.8% decline in Q4, owing to the weakness of the 
labour market, the continuing contraction in consumer credit –20% year-on-year) and, most 
particularly, the fall in remittances (which stand at a six-year low).
However, perhaps the most notable aspect of recent developments in national accounts has 
been the recovery in investment. After having stabilised at a double-digit negative rate in Q2 
and Q3, gross capital formation picked up to some extent, ending the year at a much more 
moderate negative rate of around –3% year-on-year, although in some countries, such as 
Brazil, the rate has already turned positive. In this respect, factors such as the recovery in 
commodities prices (by 35% from their December 2008 low, although they are still 25% below 
their high), in world trade and in external fi nancing fl ows have contributed to improving the 
outlook for investment and even to clearing the way for plans that had been shelved owing to 
the crisis. Government consumption continued growing in Q4 (4.3% year-on-year), reaching 
particularly high rates in Argentina and Chile.
From the standpoint of the external sector, the highlight was the return to a trade surplus, to 
2% of GDP for the region in 2009 (see Chart 6). The trade surplus was at a record level in 2009 
-24 
-16 
-8 
0 
8 
16 
24 
32 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
 LATIN AMERICA (a) 
 ARGENTINA  
 BRAZIL 
 CHILE 
 MEXICO 
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
Year-on-year rate 
% y-o-y 
-10 
-8 
-5 
-3 
0 
3 
5 
8 
10 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
 LATIN AMERICA  (a) 
 ARGENTINA 
 BRAZIL 
 CHILE 
 MEXICO 
% y-o-y 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
Year-on-year rate 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION, GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT 
Year-on-year rates and percentage points 
CHART 4 
SOURCE: National statistics. 
 
a. Seven biggest economies. 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
 LATIN AMERICA (a) 
 ARGENTINA  
 BRAZIL 
 CHILE 
 MEXICO 
% y-o-y 
GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
Year-on-year rate 
-8 
-6 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
 EXTERNAL DEMAND 
 PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
 GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
 GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
 STOCKBUILDING 
  pp 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO YEAR-ON-YEAR 
GDP GROWTH (a)  
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 112 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2010 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. FIRST HALF OF 2010
in Argentina and Colombia and unchanged in Brazil; in Mexico the defi cit lessened. In Vene-
zuela, the trade surplus for the year fell substantially, although the pick-up in oil prices has 
contributed to some improvement in recent quarters. Both imports and exports fell at a year-
on-year rate of close to –30% in mid-2009, and they continued to run negative rates at the end 
of the year. However, there has been an appreciable recovery in exports across the region in 
early 2010, towards a growth rate of 10%, higher than that of imports and in line with develop-
ments in world demand. The pick-up in exports was particularly dynamic in the South Ameri-
can commodity-exporting countries (Argentina, Chile and Peru), where exports to China (par-
ticularly metals and agricultural produce) account for more than 12% of the total. Conversely, 
in Mexico, although the external sector contributed positively to growth, external demand only 
began to pick up towards 2009 Q4, further to the recovery in the US economy with which it is 
highly integrated. Against this backdrop, the current account held virtually in balance (–0.1% 
of GDP in 2009), albeit showing signifi cant differences from country to country. The current 
account defi cit tended to widen in Brazil in the second half of the year, to –1.5%, in the face of 
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the deteriorating balances on income and services. Mexico and Colombia also posted a cur-
rent account defi cit at the close of 2009 (–0.6% and –2.8%, respectively), while Argentina, 
Chile, Peru and Venezuela continued to run a surplus (which has narrowed signifi cantly in this 
latter country).
Finally, the higher-frequency indicators suggest that the buoyancy of the economy will have 
stepped up or, at least, have held unchanged in early 2010. Industrial production has resumed 
a year-on-year rate of over 5%, similar to that recorded in the 2006-2008 pre-crisis period, and 
capacity utilisation, confi dence indicators and retail sales have increased.
Over the past six months, the recovery in Latin American fi nancial markets begun in March 
2009 fi rmed, although they were temporarily affected by the bouts of global volatility fi rst, in 
December, with the rescheduling of the debt of a Dubai fund, and subsequently, in early 2010, 
with the increased perception of sovereign risk in some European countries, in particular 
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Greece. There were also episodes of specifi c instability in some countries in the region (Ven-
ezuela and Argentina), which translated into greater asset price volatility on these markets.
Against this background, capital fl ows recovered forcefully in late 2009, as did private and govern-
ment issues on international markets ($46 billion, fourfold the amount in the fi rst half of the year). 
However, over the year as a whole, private capital net fl ows ($41 billion, according to the IMF) 
were down on 2008 (see Chart 7), since the rebound in offi cial fl ows disguised the total fi gure. 
Foreign direct investment continued to constitute the main capital fl ow towards the region (around 
$70 billion), although it slowed markedly (see Box 2), while portfolio infl ows turned positive once 
again in 2009, following their decline the previous year. Lastly, bank fl ows (included under “other 
fl ows” in Chart 7) posted a fall of close to $60 billion, larger than that of the previous year.
The exchange rates of the main Latin American currencies broadly held on a rising path, al-
though this was much more pronounced than that seen in March to September the previous 
year (see Chart 8). The Brazilian real, the Chilean peso and the Colombian peso stood during 
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BOX ?TÍTULO RECUADRO 2SPANISH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA DURING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
This box describes recent developments in Spanish investment fl ows 
in Latin America1, stressing the behaviour of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as a main fl ow of fi nancing to the region. To do this, data are 
drawn from the Banco de España Balance of Payments and Interna-
tional Investment Position from 1999 to the latest published period.2 
In all cases, the FDI data analysed are net, i.e. they constitute resi-
dents’ investment abroad minus disinvestment.
In the past two years there have been signifi cant changes both in 
terms of the volume and composition of Spanish direct investment 
fl ows abroad, in parallel with the reduction seen in global FDI fl ows, 
which has also affected Latin America. Spanish FDI peaked in 2007, 
at over €100 billion. However, in 2008 and 2009, in the context of the 
international fi nancial crisis, there was a marked decline of practically 
70% - taking the average for the two years relative to the 2007 peak 
- in these fl ows, down to slightly below the average for the past dec-
ade (€31 billion). This fall is essentially a result of a decline in invest-
ment within the European Union and, to a lesser extent, in investment 
to the rest of the world (see Panel 1). The main causes behind this 
recent behaviour are largely common to most countries: the fi nancing 
restrictions on international markets evident since the summer of 
2007; the high debt of non-fi nancial corporations; the worsening of 
the fi nancial crisis from September 2008, and the process of adjust-
ment of the Spanish economy.
Conversely, in contrast to the fall in outward Spanish FDI during this 
period, direct investment in Latin America initially held up somewhat 
better, since it maintained levels in 2008 similar to those for 2007, at 
around €13 billion, the highest since 2001. This is in line with the be-
haviour of global foreign direct investment in Latin America in 2008 
(also at record levels that year3), which has been partly attributed to the 
resilience shown by economic growth in these countries during the fi rst 
year of crisis, to the continuation of high commodities prices for much 
of 2008, and probably also to the characteristic inertia in foreign invest-
ment decisions, which were taken in the pre-crisis boom period.
1. Unless otherwise specifi ed, this box will use the aggregate of the seven big-
gest economies of the region (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru 
and Venezuela), which accounted for 88% of Spanish direct investment into 
Latin America in 2009 2. In the case of the Balance of Payments, to Decem-
ber 2009; and for the International Investment Position, to 2009 Q4. The geo-
graphical breakdown for the years 2007-2009 is still a preliminary estimate. A 
revision of the data will be published in The Spanish Balance of Payments and 
International Investment Position. 2009, later this year.
3. $128 billion according to CEPAL (2009), “La inversión extranjera directa en 
América Latina y el Caribe, 2008”, and $92.2 billion according to the IMF 
(2010), World Economic Outlook, April 2010.
SOURCES: Balance of Payments, UNCTAD, Bureau of Economic Analysis and Banco de España. 
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BOX ?TÍTULO RECUADRO
In 2009, however, there was a strong decline in Spanish direct invest-
ment outfl ows to Latin America, which stood at €2.8 billion. This de-
cline was in response both to the deterioration in growth and invest-
ment in Spain and in Latin America, and to the tightening of borrowing 
conditions in a setting of greater uncertainty, as well as to some spe-
cifi c factors. The level reached was similar to that of 2003, which 
marked a low for the decade following the Latin American crisis at the 
turn of the century. Notwithstanding, direct investment in Latin America 
has continued to account for a sizeable portion of Spanish FDI (25% 
on average in the period 2008-2009), and it has remained the most 
stable component of the fi nancial account (see Panel 2). Moreover, the 
international investment position in Latin America, where infl uential fac-
tors include not only direct investment fl ows but also, inter alia, effects 
relating to exchange rate valuation and asset price changes, increased 
at end-2009 to 27% (€120 billion) of the total Spanish investment posi-
tion, with Brazil, Argentina and Mexico respectively ranked second, 
sixth and seventh in the classifi cation by country, which underscores 
Spain’s continuing sound presence in these countries.
The breakdown of direct investment by country in recent years illus-
trates differentiated behaviour in this regional overview (see Panel 3). 
Whereas in 2008 direct investment outfl ows increased slightly on 
2007 in most Latin American countries (with the exception of Brazil, 
where direct investment grew less than in 2007), in 2009 it slowed in 
all countries, except Mexico, where it held stable. And in Venezuela, 
there was notable disinvestment (for a value of €2 billion). This disin-
vestment is strongly infl uenced by the sale of Spanish companies’ 
shares in Venezuelan corporations, against the backdrop of the na-
tionalisation programme undertaken by this country since 2008. 
There was also disinvestment, albeit on a much smaller scale, in Chile 
and Peru. If the effect of Venezuela were excluded, Spanish direct 
investment in Latin America in 2009 would stand at around 65% of 
the average over the past decade. In the remaining countries, both in 
terms of absolute volume and as a proportion of GDP and of total 
Spanish FDI, most direct investment in 2009 was targeted on Brazil 
and Mexico. This is in contrast to the pattern followed to 2005, when 
the relative weight of Chile and Argentina was greatest.4
Finally, the sizeable weight of fl ows in sectors such as fi nancial serv-
ices, telecommunications and public services in total Spanish direct 
investment in Latin America means that this investment is essentially 
tied to the business cycle and to the growth prospects of domestic 
demand in the region, although logically it may be infl uenced by the 
situation of the Spanish economy. In this respect, the outlook for 
2010 is more positive.
2SPANISH FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA DURING THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (cont’d)
4. See Enrique Alberola and Juan Carlos Berganza (2008), “Una evolución 
cuantitativa y cualitativa de la IED española en América Latina en 1996-2005”, 
in R. Casilda (ed.), Globalización, inversiones y multinacionales españolas en 
América Latina: huellas y perspectivas, pp. 319-338.
before the end of the year, coinciding with the closure of banks and the emergence of energy 
problems. But it narrowed to around 800 bp following the devaluation early in the year. Among 
other factors, this reduction might refl ect the fact that the devaluation improves the public sec-
tor’s bolivar-denominated receipts and, therefore, its solvency. In the remaining countries, 
CDSs fl uctuated while moving on a declining trend, except at the times of greatest tension on 
international markets. In Mexico, the reduction in the CDS and the narrowing vis-à-vis Brazil 
was despite the fact that two rating agencies downgraded Mexican debt in November and 
December, arguing that its fi scal reform was insuffi cient. Conversely, Moody’s upgraded Peru’s 
sovereign debt in December to investment grade. Finally, the earthquake in Chile in late Febru-
ary 2010 prompted a rise in the sovereign CDS which, even so, remains the lowest in the re-
gion at around 70 bp.
Turning to the stock markets, the regional index for Latin America ended the period with gains 
of around 5% in local currency, with a similar result in dollars. That means a similar movement 
to that of emerging Asia and of the developed countries on the whole, although one far below 
that recorded in the previous six-month period. Country by country, all the region’s stock mar-
kets posted gains - of around 10% - except for Peru, which held at a similar level to that of the 
start of the period. That said, the Peruvian stock market showed the biggest rise in 2009, with 
its index doubling in value.
Infl ation in the region as a whole began to rise in late 2009 from a rate of slightly over 5%, the 
downward path initiated a year earlier (see Chart 9) having run its course. The disinfl ation proc-
ess in Latin America in 2009 was mostly due to food price developments (in particular to the 
Prices and 
macroeconomic policies
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this period at relatively appreciated levels, only around 10% down on the highs reached in 
early 2008, before the crisis spread to the emerging economies. The appreciating trend was 
particularly sharp towards October, and was countered by central banks’ heavy purchases of 
reserves, along with the application of prudential measures and some capital controls (see 
Table 2). Particularly notable among these was Brazil’s reintroduction of the 2% tax on cross-
border fi nancial transactions (OIF by its Portuguese abbreviation), which proved effective, at 
least in the short run, when it came to moderating capital infl ows and stabilising the exchange 
rate. Certain requirements were also reintroduced in Peru for foreign currency transactions, 
given the rising trend of the sol. The Mexican peso appreciated by around 10% over the past 
six months, the biggest appreciation in the region, and one possibly related to the recovery in 
the dollar and the improved growth outlook in North America; that said, the peso is still rela-
tively depreciated in respect of its pre-crisis levels. The Argentine peso held stable for most of 
the period, moving on something of a depreciating trend as from the end of the year, against 
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a background of renewed capital outfl ows related to factors of institutional instability (in par-
ticular, those associated with the use of international reserves to repay debt, which led to the 
resignation of the central bank governor). These factors also affected Argentina’s remaining 
fi nancial variables. Finally, in early January the Venezuelan bolivar was devalued by 50%, and 
a new system with two offi cial exchange rates was set in place.
Sovereign spreads measured by the EMBI oscillated in a relatively narrow range, between 300 bp 
and 375 bp throughout the period, following their strong decline in the March-September 
period. The tendency was one of reduction, with a 75 bp rebound in January (related to 
Greece’s diffi culties), which was subsequently reversed in full. In terms of specifi c factors, 
mention should be made of the greater volatility of the EMBI and the sovereign CDS in Argen-
tina and Venezuela. In Argentina, the sovereign CDS rose in late January above 1200 bp owing 
to the heightening of institutional uncertainty. It fell once more towards a low at the end of the 
period, set against the general improvement in markets and the prospect of the resolution of 
the debt swap for bond holdouts, whose conditions were made public in mid-April (see the 
section “Economic developments by country”). In Venezuela, the CDS climbed up to 1400 bp 
INFLATION AND OFFICIAL INTEREST RATES 
Year-on-year rates of change 
CHART 9 
SOURCES: National statistics and Banco de España.
a. Aggregate of the seven main economies.
b. Weighted average of the official rates of the five countries with inflation targets.
c. Banco de España calculations stripping out the food and energy indices from the overall index.
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reversal of the base effect of the 2008 rise), while offi cial core infl ation, though it eased, did so 
to a lesser extent. And this despite the opening of considerable output gaps in several coun-
tries. In any event, this moderation in price growth was conducive to an improvement in ex-
pectations and allowed infl ation to stand below offi cial central bank targets, to the extent that 
in Chile, Colombia and Peru the rate fell below the target fl oor (see Table 3). Brazil and Mexico 
were within target, although infl ation stood in the upper range of the target band.
From December 2009 to March 2010, however, consumer prices rose to a year-on-year rate 
of 6.5% for the region as a whole. At the regional level, this rise is due in equal parts to food 
and energy (which had fallen to very low year-on-year rates of under 1.5% and 0.5%, respec-
tively), in addition to certain one-off factors such as rises in taxes and administered prices in 
some countries. Hence, while there are substantial cross-country differences (see the section 
“Economic developments by country”) and although the underlying component - calculated 
on the basis of national price indices, uniformly stripping out the food and energy indices - has 
held relatively stable at a rate of close to 4% (see Chart 9), the recent increase in prices has, 
according to surveys, been accompanied by a moderate but constant rise in infl ation expecta-
tions since late 2009.
In this setting, monetary policies remained exceptionally lax throughout last year. However, 
given the recovery in activity, the progressive closing of output gaps in some economies, the 
relatively expansionary bias still characterising fi scal policies, the sensitivity of infl ation to com-
modities prices and the rise in infl ation, some countries have begun to unwind their expansion-
ary monetary policy measures (some of which were exceptional) applied during the crisis. 
Thus, for instance, Brazil announced in February that it would progressively reverse most of 
the reduction in bank reserve requirements applied during the crisis, which accounts for a 
signifi cant drainage of liquidity, and it raised its offi cial interest rate by 75 bp to 9.5% at the end 
of April. In contrast, it has once again funded the public bank BNDES, and the interest rate 
MEASURES DESCRIPTION
COUNTRY (a)
(currently or previously used)
Reserve requirements on deposits or debt 
raised abroad
AR, CO*, CL, PE*
Minimum holding period for foreign investment AR, CL, CO*
Taxes on portfolio inflows BR*
Taxes on profits arising on derivatives 
transactions
PE*
Provisions Dynamic provisions CO*, PE*
Higher requirements during periods of strong 
capital inflows and lower requirements during 
periods of outflows 
BR*, CO*, PE*
Higher requirements for foreign-currency 
deposits than for local-currency deposits
AR (pre-OCT 08), PE*
Limits on the net foreign-currency position as a 
percentage of equity
CO, AR, BR, CL, PE
Limits on the net spot and net derivatives 
positions in foreign currency as a percentage of 
equity
CO* 
Measures to discourage short-term capital 
inflows (capital controls)
Reserve requirement
Currency-based imbalances
PRUDENTIAL MEASURES AND CAPITAL CONTROLS TO MITIGATE THE IMPACT OF  FINANCIAL FLOWS TABLE 2
SOURCE: Banco de España. 
* Measures taken from 2006 onwards. 
a. AR: Argentina , BR: Brazil, CL: Chile, CO: Colombia and PE: Peru. 
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applied by this institution, applicable to the fi nancing of many large corporations, has held 
unchanged at the historically low level of 6%. Chile announced in November that it would 
gradually withdraw its exceptional term liquidity facility before May. The Brazilian and Mexican 
swap lines with the Federal Reserve were not renewed upon their expiry in February, which 
may also be interpreted along the same lines as the withdrawal of exceptional measures and 
the normalisation of the functioning of the markets.
The fi nancial markets expect some central banks in the region (including most notably Brazil’s) 
to progressively reverse the sharp reductions in rates applied during the crisis. This may be 
complemented by alternative measures, such as reserve requirements. But the situation is not 
homogenous. Continuing wide output gaps (Mexico), the temporary nature of the shocks re-
ceived (Chile, Colombia) and other considerations (Venezuela, Argentina) suggest that the 
cycle of offi cial interest rate rises will not begin simultaneously in all countries, and might be 
delayed in some of them; in fact, Colombia made a fresh cut to its offi cial interest rate, to 3%, 
in late April.
A second consideration concerning the possible tightening of monetary policy is whether, in a 
context of recovering capital fl ows like the present, the management of interest rates might 
once again face a dilemma; namely, that the upward pressure on currencies it has been sought 
to avert is actually accentuated, especially in view of the prospect of high liquidity being main-
tained in the developed countries. In this respect, although only some countries (Brazil, Peru) 
have limited infl ows with specifi c capital controls, most have opted to build up reserves to 
above pre-crisis levels (see Chart 10). Conventional ratios of the appropriateness of reserves 
(such as reserves/imports, or reserves/short-term external debt), and also more demanding 
ratios, show that reserves are now generally at very high levels (see Table 4).
The foregoing raises the issue of the IMF’s capacity to replace the individual accumulation of 
reserves as an insurance mechanism against potential crises. While it is generally acknowl-
edged that the build-up of reserves as an insurance mechanism is costly and relatively ineffi -
cient, and that it generates growing distortions, the countries that accumulate reserves claim 
that the main advantages are (i) autonomy in respect of the use of reserves; (ii) that during a 
crisis the volume of reserves needed to instil confi dence and prevent capital fl ight is much 
greater than what the conventional ratios indicate; and, therefore, (iii) that there is a need to 
retain very wide margins (to also replace in full capital outfl ows for a time). Further, some coun-
tries consider that accumulation is also in response to a second objective, namely to temper 
excessive exchange-rate volatility (and/or appreciation), which cannot be achieved through 
Target dic-09 Fulfillment Target Expectations (a) Target Expectations (a)
Brazil 4.5 ± 2 4.3 Yes 4.5 ± 2 4.8 4.5 ± 2 4.7
Mexico 3 ± 1 3.6 Yes 3 ± 1 5.2 3 ± 1 3.9
Chile 3 ± 1 -2.6 No 3 ± 1 3.7 3 ± 1 3.2
Colombia 4.5 a 5.5 2 No 3 ± 1 3.8 3 ± 1 3.8
Peru 2 ± 1 0.3 No 2 ± 1 2.2 2 ± 1 2.5
2011
Country
20102009
INFLATION 
Year-on-year rates of change 
TABLE 3
SOURCES: National statistics and Consensus Forecasts. 
a. Consensus Forecasts, March 2010. 
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recourse to the IMF. Set against this assessment, they consider that the characteristics of the 
alternative multilateral instruments, such as the IMF’s FCL (fl exible credit line), their short term, 
the size of the amounts that would be considered necessary in some countries, and their im-
perfect substitutability for reserves in the eyes of the rating agencies may not be suffi cient. 
Accordingly, lines such as the FCL are viewed as useful, although they are considered to be 
complementary in nature, and the countries appear to continue showing a preference for self-
insurance. In this sense, countries such as Colombia and Mexico have decided to renew in full 
or in part this line with the IMF, while Mexico announced that it will accumulate reserves, a 
change on its previous policy.
Finally, given the circumstances, developments in public fi nances will be a relevant factor in 
2010, with the start of an electoral cycle in many countries (Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Vene-
zuela and Peru) that will run into 2011 (Peru and Argentina). In 2009, the fi scal position 
weakened as a result of the cyclical collapse of revenue and, in some countries, of the 
momentum of spending. The primary surplus of 3% in 2008 was practically erased and the 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES AND MAIN INDICATORS OF PUBLIC SECTOR 
PERFORMANCE 
CHART 10 
SOURCE: National statistics. 
 
a. Seven biggest economies. 
b. Deflated by the CPI. 
c. Excludes untendered debt in the debt swap offer of 2005. 
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budget moved from a balanced position to a defi cit of 2.7% in the region as a whole (see 
Table 1 and Chart 10). Public debt/GDP ratios rose by around 5 pp of regional GDP (to 
35.8% of GDP in the aggregate), breaking the downward trend of recent years, although 
the increase was much more moderate than that in the industrialised economies (around 
17 pp of output).
Exceptions aside, this situation does not appear to pose risks in the short run, but it might 
infl uence monetary policy and, more specifi cally, the balance and timing of exit strategies. 
Given that expansionary fi scal packages in Latin America (with the exception of Chile and, to 
some extent, Peru) were much more limited than in the industrialised economies, the need to 
design an exit or fi scal consolidation strategy would now also be less pressing. However, the 
dynamism shown by some economies in recent months would probably advise tightening 
fi scal policy now that the recovery allows it, which in turn would lessen pressure on monetary 
policy and, indirectly, on the exchange rate. Although there are clear divergences from coun-
try to country, the budgets for 2010 are generally of a continuist nature (in Brazil and Colom-
bia priority is not given to expenditure consolidation) or even a procyclical bent (in the case of 
Argentina and Peru) in a year in which the electoral cycle may make the containment of 
spending somewhat more diffi cult. Chile, which had envisaged withdrawing most of its fi scal 
stimulus measures in 2010 (although it had not yet returned to the 0.5%structural surplus 
rule), has announced a fund for the reconstruction of earthquake-affected areas comprising 
more than 5 pp of GDP. Mexico is expected to be the main exception, after having an-
nounced a budget that includes a rise in VAT and spending cuts aimed at reducing the State 
defi cit to 0.75% in 2010. Conceivably, and although there may be differences from one coun-
try to another, in the region as a whole the monetary impulse will probably be reversed before 
the fi scal one is.
Set against declining global trade in 2009, trade integration processes in Latin America have 
once again shown the duality present in the region for several years now. Chile, Colombia and 
Trade integration and 
structural policies
2008 GDP
Exports
+
Imports
Investment 
portfolio 
liabilities
Investment 
portfolio 
liabilities + 
other 
investment
Short-term 
external debt
M2
Monetary 
base
Argentina 13.8 35.0 236.0 56.5 214.6 72.0 128.9
Brazil 12.3 50.7 67.1 48.0 497.0 33.0 239.7
Mexico 8.7 15.4 40.9 31.0 259.9 16.9 183.3
Chile 13.6 18.0 112.6 33.1 153.8 22.5 285.0
Colombia 9.7 30.3 142.4 48.5 416.4 27.5 —
Venezuela 10.4 27.9 244.8 88.5 194.8 — —
Peru 23.7 49.3 157.5 65.9 482.8 — 396.8
South Korea 21.6 23.5 80.1 40.4 — 15.5 —
China 45.0 76.1 1,209.2 371.3 1,317.1 28.5 —
India 20.5 48.1 264.8 83.3 585.1 — —
Malaysia 41.1 24.4 141.6 84.4 — 33.7 —
Poland 11.2 15.8 75.5 28.2 90.7 21.6 —
Hungary 21.7 15.8 57.3 22.8 123.4 40.8 159.4
Russia 24.6 52.0 370.2 77.6 563.6 76.0 —
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF DIFFERENT VARIABLES. 2008 TABLE 4
SOURCES: IMF (IFS and WEO) and IIF. 
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Peru further pursued their strategy of bilateral agreements, particularly with Asian countries. 
During the period under study, Chile entered into free trade agreements with Turkey and Ma-
laysia, while Peru did so with Singapore, Thailand, China, Canada and the EFTA countries 
(Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). In early March 2010, Peru and Colombia 
reached a free trade agreement with the European Union which will be ratifi ed at the joint sum-
mit in May. Colombia extended the ATPDEA with the United States. Conversely, Mercosur and 
the Andean Community have continued to face serious obstacles, including the application of 
trade restrictions among their own members and the lack of agreement on Venezuela fi nally 
joining. More positively, Uruguay might shortly follow the Argentine-Brazilian initiative to use 
local currency in trade, although this initiative currently covers very few transactions (scarcely 
1.6% of bilateral trade). Also, the fi rst sucre-denominated transactions between the ALBA 
(Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) countries were carried out, the sucre being conceived 
as a common unit of exchange.
As regards structural reforms, no substantial progress was made. Venezuela put new oil fi elds 
out to tender under the new rules for access by the domestic or foreign private sector to this 
type of business within Venezuela (majority State holding, prior fi nancing of the State oil com-
pany and non-use of reserves as collateral for debt), and State control of the fi nancial sector 
was reinforced with the nationalisation of several of the banks taken over at the end of the year. 
As to the international measures adopted, both Brazil and Chile and Mexico undertook to in-
crease the fi nancing they grant to the International Monetary Fund. Moreover, Chile became 
the second Latin American country to join the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development (OECD).
The pick-up in economic growth in Brazil continued during Q3 and Q4 (at respective quarterly 
rates of 1.3% and 2%). As a result, the year-on-year decline in GDP eased in Q3, and activity 
rose strongly to 4.3% in Q4. The recovery was boosted by domestic demand (which contrib-
uted more than 5 pp to growth), with private consumption expanding strongly and investment 
resuming a positive growth rate after the sharp adjustment during the three previous quarters. 
External demand subtracted several tenths of a point from growth in Q4 owing to the pick-up 
in imports. The indicators for 2010 Q1 point to a further acceleration in activity. In the labour 
market, the unemployment rate fell, reaching a historical low in late 2009, although it subse-
quently rose by several tenths of a point, possibly due to seasonal factors. The recovery in the 
economy came about against a background of moderating infl ation to December, within the 
central bank’s target range. However, the incipient rise in prices (5.2% in March, owing largely 
to food prices, given that the core infl ation rate held practically stable) and some increase in 
infl ation expectations raised the issue of whether the economic stimuli should be withdrawn. 
In this setting, the central bank set out a timetable for the progressive raising of reserve re-
quirements, largely reversing the decrease applied during the crisis, and the cycle of offi cial 
interest rate rises began with a 75 bp increase to 9.5% at the end of April. Turning to fi scal 
policy, certain tax exemptions were extended, with others being introduced, and the provision 
of new funds to the development bank was announced. Public fi nances continued to worsen, 
due partly to cyclical factors. As a result, the primary surplus at the close of the year stood at 
2.1% of GDP, below the government’s target of 2.5%, and the budget defi cit duly widened. 
The primary surplus improved to some extent early in the year, owing to the moderation of 
spending and the increase in revenue, but the proximity of presidential elections (in October) 
may hamper the containment of spending this year. In any event, the aim of the draft budget 
for 2010 is a primary surplus for the consolidated public sector of 3.3% of GDP, up on the 
2009 fi gure. The current account balance posted a moderate defi cit in 2009 of 1.6% of GDP. 
However, in early 2010 it showed a clear deterioration owing to the signifi cant recovery in im-
ports, refl ecting the thrust of domestic demand. The second half of 2009 saw a strong rise in 
Economic developments 
by country
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fi nancial fl ows to Brazil, particularly portfolio fl ows, which generated signifi cant upward pres-
sure on the currency (see Chart 11). Against this background, the authorities introduced a tax 
(IOF by its Portuguese abbreviation) on fi nancial infl ows relating to the purchase of bond and 
stock market instruments, and the notable build-up of international reserves continued (this 
has eased in early 2010). Given this propitious external backdrop, Brazil was able to resort to 
the international markets under favourable conditions, and did not renew its swap facility with 
the Federal Reserve, which expired in February. Furthermore, Brazil has purchased IMF bonds 
for a value of $10 billion, and has undertaken to purchase further bonds worth $4 billion.
In Mexico, economic activity picked up markedly in the second half of the year, posting quar-
terly growth rates of 2.5% and 2%. Even so, year-on-year rates remained strongly negative 
(–6.1% and –2.3%), and the year closed with the biggest decline in GDP since 1932. The re-
covery was much more vigorous from November, coinciding with the recovery in industrial 
activity in the United States, and was underpinned by manufacturing (initially in the car indus-
try, but subsequently in other sectors too), while construction remained weak. The breakdown 
of GDP confi rms, in turn, that the recovery is external demand-led, whereas private consump-
tion and investment, despite improving somewhat, continued to post negative year-on-year 
rates. The Q1 indicators suggest some acceleration in activity, which is expected to continue 
to be based on external demand. Hence, whereas exports and industrial production have 
shown signs of renewed dynamism, the consumer confi dence, retail sales and gross invest-
BRAZIL, MEXICO AND VENEZUELA 
SOURCES: Central Bank of Brazil, Bank of Mexico, Central Bank of Venezuela. 
 
a. 1994 Q4 and 2008 Q3 = 100. The dotted line plots projections based on Bank of Mexico 
surveys. 
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ment indicators are holding at very low levels. In this setting, and despite the fact that the 
growth outlook for 2010 and 2011 has improved signifi cantly in recent months, the decline in 
activity in 2009 means that Mexico will continue to evidence a negative output gap until late 
2011 (see Chart 11). The infl ation rate eased from October thanks to positive base effects, 
standing within the Mexican central bank’s target range at the end of 2009. Core infl ation was 
higher. In the opening months of 2010, infl ation has increased by more than 1 pp (to 5%) as a 
result of the rise in indirect taxes, but this should be a one-off effect. The central bank held its 
offi cial interest rate at the July level of 4.5%, at which rate it is expected to remain in the com-
ing months. Public fi nances worsened substantially in 2009, moving from balance to a defi cit 
of –2.1%, the worst fi gure since 1990. In the case of the primary surplus, the deterioration was 
from 1.8% to –0.1% of GDP. The fall in oil revenue was propitious to fi scal reform and the rise 
in taxes in 2010. These measures did not prevent the downgrading of Mexico’s sovereign rat-
ing by Fitch and Standard and Poor’s. And, at the end of March, the government unveiled a 
new, moderately ambitious multi-year saving plan. The current account balance posted a 
defi cit of 0.6% of GDP in 2009, compared with 1.7% in 2008, and this despite the fact there 
was a strong deterioration in Q3 stemming from the trade balance having moved from surplus 
into defi cit owing to the forceful increase in imports. Incoming foreign direct investment was 
75% lower than in the fi rst half of the year, when the fi gure was already low compared with 
previous years. Conversely, portfolio investment infl ows increased strongly in the period, off-
setting in full the outfl ows in late 2008 and early 2009. The swap line with the Federal Reserve 
was not renewed, but faced with the return of portfolio fl ows the Mexican central bank de-
cided to replenish its foreign currency reserves, while the FCL with the IMF (for $47 billion) was 
renewed.
In Argentina, GDP grew at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 1.9% in 2009 Q4, after posting a fi gure 
of 0.2% in Q3 (the respective year-on-year rates were –0.3% and 2.6%). The highlight was the 
improvement in domestic demand, boosted by the recovery in private and government con-
sumption. Investment held at a negative rate. External demand also made a positive contribu-
tion to growth in the fi nal quarter of 2009. Infl ation, unlike in the rest of the region, rose during 
the six-month period, returning to a level of around 9.7% in March on offi cial fi gures, against a 
background of unchanged and strongly expansionary fi scal and monetary policies, and of a 
gradual depreciation of the currency. In a setting of lower capital-account pressures, the Ar-
gentine central bank cut its seven-day reverse repo interest rate by 25 bp in October to 9.5%, 
following the cumulative reduction of 125 bp from July to September. The current account 
surplus widened by 1 pp of GDP in 2009 (to 3.7%), thanks to the bigger trade surplus. Con-
versely, foreign direct investment was halved, posting its lowest level since 2004, whereas 
portfolio investment outfl ows eased towards the end of the year after having been very intense 
over several quarters; however, they increased once again in early 2010 further to heightened 
institutional uncertainty. In 2009, the federal government’s primary surplus was 1.5% of GDP 
(against 3.1% in 2008). This fi gure was higher than expected, due largely to the recording in 
December of a portion of special drawing rights as revenue, further to increased IMF resourc-
es. Underpinning the growth of government revenue during 2009 were social security contri-
butions (largely because of the nationalisation of the so-called AFJP [ retirement and pension 
fund managers]), and primary spending increased to a greater extent. Developments in provin-
cial public fi nances were much more adverse, which led the government to relax the fi scal 
responsibility rule for the provinces for two years. The half-year period under analysis also saw 
the repeal of the law that prevented the country from reopening the external debt swap carried 
out in 2005, after which a fresh offer was directed at bond holdouts (bondholders who did not 
avail themselves of the previous offer) for a total of $20 billion of capital plus $10 billion of ac-
crued interest. The bonds offered are the same as those under the 2005 debt swap, although 
they do not include the arrears since 2005 on the coupons indexed to Argentine GDP. Minor-
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ity investors will receive the accrued interest in cash. Finally, the government’s initiative to cre-
ate a fund to cover payment of the external debt with international reserves, which has already 
been drawn down for an amount of more than $1.1 billion, resulted in the central bank gover-
nor being replaced.
In Chile, GDP shrank by 1.4% year-on-year in 2009 Q3, but rose by 2.1% in Q4. The improve-
ment in domestic demand, thanks to the pick-up in private consumption (5.5% year-on-year 
at the close of 2009) and the persistence of very high government consumption growth rates 
were the main factors behind the recovery. External demand also contributed positively to 
growth, but much more moderately. The high-frequency indicators for Q1 pointed to an ac-
celeration in growth, but the earthquake in late February substantially changed the outlook. 
The central bank estimates that the loss of productive capital is of the order of 3%, which has 
led the growth projections for 2010 and 2011 to be revised downwards and upwards, respec-
tively, by several tenths of a point. Infl ation was more volatile than in other countries in the re-
gion, giving rise to a reduction from 9.9% in October 2008 to –2.3% in November 2009, and 
a subsequent rise to 0.3% in March 2010. In respect of infl ation, the earthquake has resulted 
in the temporary confl uence of a supply-side shock due to product shortages and a demand-
side shock due to the negative wealth effect, which might cause prices to rise somewhat more 
in 2010, falling thereafter in 2011. The central bank held offi cial rates at 0.5%, and it began to 
withdraw the extraordinary liquidity facility that it adopted during the crisis. The current ac-
count balance posted a surplus of 2.8% of GDP in 2009, compared with the defi cit of 1.5% in 
2008, the result both of the increase in the trade surplus (8.5% of GDP) and of the reduction 
in the income defi cit. The budget defi cit stood at 4.5% of GDP (0.9% in the case of the struc-
tural defi cit) as a result of the application of a strongly countercyclical fi scal policy. Public debt 
accounted for 6.3% of GDP, a little more than 1 pp above the 2008 rate, while the Economic 
and Social Stabilisation Fund, after having fallen during the year by somewhat more than 5 pp 
of GDP, totalled $11.29 billion (6.5% of GDP) at end-2009, which fi nanced the fi scal stimulus 
plan. Prior to the earthquake, the budget for 2010 had withdrawn most of the impulse meas-
ures, although there was no return, for the second year running, to the 0.5% structural surplus 
rule. Nonetheless, after the earthquake priorities shifted towards spending on reconstruction, 
which is expected to account for around 5 pp of GDP over several years, and will be fi nanced 
by temporary tax increases, the reassignment of budgetary appropriations, the sovereign fund 
and local and foreign currency-denominated issues. In these circumstances, the central bank 
has indicated that the offi cial interest rate will be maintained pending observation of the impact 
of the earthquake on activity and infl ation, but that it might stand at around 5% over a horizon 
of two years.
Following four quarters of negative year-on-year rates, Colombia showed an appreciable re-
covery in late 2009, expanding at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 1.1% (compared with 0.4% the 
previous quarter), the highest rate since end-2007. That placed the year-on-year rate at 2.5%. 
The strong growth of investment, the rise in private consumption and the strength of govern-
ment consumption offset in part the sluggishness of exports, weighed down by Venezuela’s 
trade restrictions, which are expected to have subtracted up to 1 pp of growth in 2009. Infl a-
tion continued to ease, standing at the end of the year at 2%, below the central bank’s target 
(3.5%–5.5%). The central bank cut its interest rates by 50 bp in November and by a further 50 bp 
in April, to 3%, after announcing in March that it would intervene on the foreign exchange 
market with purchases of $20 million a day. Furthermore, it partly renewed (for an amount of 
$3.5 billion) the FCL with the IMF. Turning to the external sector, the current account defi cit 
widened in the second half of 2009 to 2.2% of GDP, the result of an increase in the defi cit on 
the incomes balance. The public sector posted a defi cit of 4.1% of GDP in 2009, compared 
with 2.3% in 2008, while for 2010 a defi cit of up to 4.5% of GDP is projected, owing to the 
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decline in revenue and despite the downward revision of public spending. However, external 
borrowing needs are expected to be covered by the issue made in early April.
Peru recovered substantially in the second half of the year. In year-on-year terms, a positive 
rate of change (3.4%) was recorded in Q4, following two consecutive quarters of declines. The 
improvement stemmed from the favourable behaviour of domestic demand, which was boost-
ed by the lagged impact of the fi scal stimulus package and by a notably expansionary mone-
tary policy. The contribution of the external sector continued to be strongly positive. The signs 
of recovery in private domestic demand at the onset of 2010 have been confi rmed and have 
meant that the growth projections for 2010 in Peru are among the highest in the region. Infl a-
tion reached a low in December and rose to 0.8% in March, although it is still below its target 
range (1%–3%). In these circumstances, the central bank held its offi cial interest rates un-
changed at 1.25%, although the tone of its latest announcements augurs a possible tightening 
of monetary policy given the renewed buoyancy of the economy. January saw the reintroduc-
tion of the foreign currency requirement for loans at less than two years, and a tax on gains in 
dollars arising on futures was set in place. From February, there was substantial intervention 
on the foreign exchange market. The current account balance posted a surplus of 0.2% of 
GDP in 2009, following the defi cit of 3.7% in 2008, due to the higher trade surplus stemming 
from the collapse of imports and the lower defi cit on the income balance. In the fi scal realm, 
the primary defi cit stood at 0.7% of GDP (after a surplus of 3.6% in 2009) as a result of the 
application of a countercyclical fi scal policy.
In 2009 Q4, Venezuela showed a decline in GDP of 5.8% (–4.6% in the previous quarter), and 
this despite the fact that oil prices held practically throughout the year above their historical 
average (see Chart 11). The factor behind this contraction is the fall in the oil sector, owing to 
the cut in OPEC production, the weakness of demand from Venezuela’s main trading partner, 
the United States, and the fi nancial diffi culties the State oil company underwent in the fi rst half 
of the year. Domestic demand subtracted more than 24 pp from growth in Q4, in a setting of 
collapsing investment and heavily declining private consumption. Moreover, the problems of 
the banking sector in 2009 Q4 (control was taken over several fi nancial institutions accounting 
for 12% of the system’s assets and over various securities houses), along with the increasing 
contributions to the deposit guarantee fund, might have prompted an additional decline in 
credit. The infl ation rate is holding at over 25%, driven by the strong depreciation of the paral-
lel exchange rate. The diffi culties in checking this depreciation led, in early January, to the of-
fi cial exchange rate being devalued from 2.15 to 4.3 bolivar per dollar, and to a new preferen-
tial exchange rate (of 2.6 bolivar per dollar) being created for specifi c goods imports. 
Notwithstanding this and the parallel measures implemented to increase the supply of dollars 
on the market, the parallel-market exchange rate remains strongly depreciated against the 
new central parity, and reached new all-time highs in mid-April. The effect of the devaluation 
on activity is uncertain, owing to the new dual system, but the infl ationary impact will probably 
be signifi cant. In any event, State oil revenues measured in local currency will increase. Finally, 
there was a net outfl ow of foreign direct investment totalling $3.1 billion (0.9% of GDP) in 
2009.
30.4.2010. 
